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Abstract. In an overlapping generations economy setup we show that, if individuals
can improve their life expectancy by exerting some effort, costly in terms of either
resources or utility, the competitive equilibrium steady state differs from the first
best steady state. This is due to the fact that under perfect competition individuals
fail to anticipate the impact of their longevity-enhancing effort on the return of their
annuitized savings. We identify the policy instruments required to implement the
first-best into a competitive equilibrium and show that they are specific to the form,
whether utility or resources, that the effort takes.
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1. Introduction
In the last century, an unprecedented rise in life expectancy has been a pervasive
phenomenon in both developed and developing countries. This has surely been
due mostly to a host of causes affecting whole societies at large like, for instance,
progress in medicine, improvements in agriculture, and better sanitary conditions,
among others. Although there may also be among these causes a component that is
related to individual behaviors or choices, its contribution to this dramatic increase
in life expectancy is likely to have been small compared to those mentioned above.
Nevertheless, an immediate consequence, among many others, of the increase in life
expectancy is the pressure it puts on, for instance, the provision of health care, on
pay-as-you-go pensions systems, on housing, etc.1 Thus, as the constraints on these
and other resources become tighter, the relative importance of the individual-specific
causes of the increase in life expectancy may increase as well, and the question then
arises about whether the decentralized choices made by the individuals about their
efforts to have an ever increasing life expectancy are the right ones from an efficiency
viewpoint.
Individuals can privately influence their life expectancy in various ways choosing to
undertake actions and behaviors that tend to increase it, or to avoid those that may
decrease it. Nevertheless, these choices typically imply a cost for them, either in
terms of a disutility incurred or in terms of additional spending in, say, healthcare,
and hence of forgone consumption. In effect, while the most obvious way to in-
crease life expectancy is to increase medical treatment —which requires the actual
spending of income— individuals can also make behavioral choices to that end (e.g.
exercising, abstaining from smoking, eating a healthy diet, driving safely) that do
not necessarily require an additional spending, but may inflict nonetheless some
disutility on the individual.2
Despite the undisputable positive aspect of having a higher longevity, this overall
increase has had also some detrimental external effects on, for example, pension
systems, publicly provided healthcare, urban development, and the environment.
1Of course, a longer life, specifically a healthier one, increases also the labor force available for
production at any time, which works in the opposite direction, but for the sake of simplicity we
are going to make abstraction of this fact.
2On the impact of health expenditures on life expectancy, see Poikolainen (1986). Several studies
have also shown the impact of factors such as physical activity (Kaplan et al.,1987 and Okamoto,
2006), overweight (see Solomon and Manson, 1997 and Bender et al. 1998) and smoking (Doll and
Hill, 1950).
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The specific point this paper addresses is that, besides these well-known detrimen-
tal external effects, there exists another negative externality due to a higher life
expectancy simply related to the impact that the individual’s choice of quantity of
life has on his quality of life, through the private resources he is left with for his
extended life, if savings are annuitized. Becker and Philipson (1998) emphasized
already how a rise in the quantity of life can affect its quality by showing that indi-
viduals investing in their longevity do not take into account that, by doing so, they
influence the return of their annuitized savings. The result is too much investment
in longevity compared to what would be optimal. Becker and Philipson (1998) thus
suggests that one way to ensure a high return of savings should be to tax health
expenditures (and thus, implicitly longevity). Some papers give recommendations
in this direction. For example, Leroux (2008) showed that in the case of non-
contractible effort to increase longevity, the social planner should tax second-period
consumptions in order to reduce incentives for the individual to invest in longevity.
Leroux et al. (2008a,b) studied the taxation of longevity-enhancing health expen-
ditures and showed that three factors play a role in the choice of the adequate tax
rate: (i) the possible misperception by the agents of their true survival probability;
(ii) the Becker-Philipson effect, as described above; and, in case of asymmetric in-
formation, (iii) incentive constraints. Nevertheless, in Leroux (2008) and Leroux et
al. (2008a,b) the framework was essentially static, with a 2-period-lived agent that
solves a one-shot problem at the begining of the first period.
In this paper, on the contrary, we study the problem in a truly dynamic general
equilibrium framework. Adressing the issue in a dynamic setup is the natural next
step to undertake, since similar instances of inefficiencies due to an overlooked (by
competitive agents) impact of individual saving decisions on the saving returns arise
naturally in overlapping generations models as well (see Da´vila (2008)). Thus we
consider an overlapping generations economy in which individuals are identical ex-
cept for the date they are born in. The representative agent is sure to live at least
one period and at most two, conditional on a survival probability. He supplies in-
elastically labor when young and consumes from his labor income when young, and
from his annuitized capital and monetary savings when old (if alive). We assume
that the representative agent can influence his survival probability exerting some
effort. We will distinguish between the case in which this effort entails a direct
disutility but no additional spending (the disutility-effort case), and the case in
which it requires some additional spending but has no direct impact on the agent’s
utility (the expenditure-effort case).3 Thus, an expenditure-effort can be thought of
3We could as well assume that the individual exerts the two different types of efforts at the same
time, but for the sake of simplicity, we consider them separately.
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simply as health expenditures that enters the individual budget constraint and as
resources unavailable for consumption or saving. A disutility-effort implies instead
a cost in terms of utility only, entering negatively the utility function but not the
budget constraint. It can be thought of generally as leading a ”healthy” way of life
(exercising, eating healthily, abstaining from smoking and other instantly gratifi-
cating pleasures, etc.), that might be unappealing to the individual at the time he
exerts the effort, but that improves also his or her life expectancy and hence the
prospects of enjoying utility from consumption in the second period of life.
Under the setup defined above, we show that, both in the disutility-effort and the
expenditure-effort cases, the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state level
of individual effort is higher than the first-best steady state, and hence inefficient.
For instance, in the expenditure-effort case the individuals do not take into account,
as in Becker and Philipson (1998), that by investing in their longevity they also
decrease the return of their annuitized savings —very much as in they do in Da´vila
(2008) by saving too much capital— and in that way they reduce their consumption
possibilities in the second period. A similar effect is observed in the disutility-effort
case. As a consequence, there is, as in the static case, room for a public intervention
aiming at making the competitive equilibrium steady state with an annuity market
for savings coincide with the first-best steady state. However, in the dynamic setup
the policy instruments needed are different from those needed in the static case, and
differ as well depending on whether the effort takes the form of a disutility or of
an expenditure. In the disutility-effort case, we show to be optimal to announce a
second-period lump-sum tax that depends on the second-period consumption of the
previous generation and on the rate of growth of the population (net of the mortality
rate between periods). Interestingly enough, at the competitive equilibrium steady
state, the amount actually raised by the tax is zero in every period, so that the
implementation of the first-best steady state allocation is achieved by the mere
announcement of the policy. If, on the contrary, the effort is an actual expenditure
(e.g. health expenditure), it simply requires to tax that expenditure at the young
age and to make a lump-sum transfer of the same amount to the contemporary
old. At the steady state, redistribution actually takes place, whenever there is
demographic growth.
Our paper can be related to the growing literature dealing with endogenous longevity
in overlapping generations setups. Some papers have already emphasized the role
of endogenous longevity in shaping growth and savings patterns (see, for exam-
ple, Chakraborty, 2004) as well as the environment (Jouvet et al., 2007). Other
papers have studied how the golden rule is modified by the introduction of endoge-
4
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nous longevity, inducing the under-accumulation of capital when longevity depends
on public health expenditures (De la Croix and Ponthie`re, 2008). These papers
differ however from ours in several respects. First, all of them consider health ex-
penditures as a publicly-provided good, so that individuals have no direct control
over their life expectancy. Second, they consider, for a given public policy, either
the competitive equilibrium steady state when the consumption-saving choice has
longevity consequences, as in Chakraborty (2004) or the first-best steady state (as
in De la Croix and Ponthie`re, 2008), but none of them shows that the laissez-faire
competitive equilibrium steady state with annuitized savings typically differs from
the first-best steady state. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, no paper
has yet established that the combination of private health expenditures and of an
annuity market requires an active fiscal policy if the first-best steady state is to
be implemented as a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, we identify the different
policies required for the implementation of the first-best depending on the specific
form that the life expectancy-increasing effort can take.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 shows for the disutility-effort case that the competitive equilibrium steady
state typically differs from the first-best steady state, and shows how to restore the
first-best. Section 4, does the same but for the expenditure-effort case. Section 5
concludes.
2. The model
Time is discrete, and at every date t, a generation of identical agents is born. The
size of the generations increases in time at a rate n. Agents live at least one period
and at most two, conditional to a survival with probability pi(et) that they can
influence by the choice of some effort level et. A period-t agent supplies inelastically
when young his labor (normalized to 1) for a real wage rate wt that he can split
as he wishes between first period consumption ct0 and saving, which he can hold in
either capital or intrinsically worthless money. His capital savings kt earn a return
rt+1at t + 1, while monetary holdings M t bought at a real price 1pt at t are worth
1
pt+1
M t at t + 1. Savings (augmented of their return) are used for second period
consumption ct1. Note that the probability of survival pi(e
t) represents also the
proportion of individuals born at t who survive to the next period. Finally, effort
can be costly to agents either in terms of utility (Section 3) or in terms of forgone
income for consumption (Section 4). The first case tries to capture the influence
on life expectancy of individual behavioral choices that are unrelated to income
5
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but undesirable per se, while the second case can be simply thought of as standard
health expenditures.
Consider first the utility-effort case. The probability of survival pi(et) depends on
an effort level et —with pi′(et) > 0 and pi′′(et) < 0— that creates a linear disutility4
γet (γ represents thus the intensity of the effort disutility, assumed to be identical
across individuals).5 The utility from consumption when young and old is given by
the differentiably increasing and concave functions u(c) and v(c) respectively with
limc0→0 u
′(c0) = +∞ = limc1→0 v′(c1). The lifetime utility of the representative
agent born at time t is then
U(ct0, c
t
1, e
t) = u(ct0) + pi(e
t)v(ct1)− γet. (1)
Since effort has no impact at all on the agent’s income, his budget constraints at
periods t and t+ 1 are respectively
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t =wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
1
pt+1
M t.
(2)
Consider now the income-effort case. We assume that the individual spends an
amount et of his income in health care, which influences his survival probability,
equal to pi(et) (as before pi′(et) > 0 and pi′′(et) < 0). In this case, in the utility
function above γ = 0 so that the agent’s utility is now
U(ct0, c
t
1, e
t) = u(ct0) + pi(e
t)v(ct1) (3)
but the agent bears a cost in terms of resources, et which reduces the first-period
income available for consumption and saving:
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t + et = wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
1
pt+1
M t.
(4)
4Note that we obtain the same results by assuming convex disutility of effort. For simplicity of
exposure, we stick to the linear case.
5For the case where the effort disutility differs across individuals in a static setup, see Leroux
(2008).
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Note that, as opposed to other endogenous longevity models (e.g. Chakraborty
(2004) and De la Croix and Ponthiere (2008)), in the two cases above the level of
effort et is chosen by the individual himself.
Production is standard: at every period, firms produce, out of capital and labor, a
single good that can be either consumed (possibly as health expenditure) or saved
to be used as capital for production the next period. The production function
F (K,L) exhibits constant returns to scale and good and factors markets are per-
fectly competitive, so that the wage rate equals the marginal productivity of labor
and the annuitized marginal productivity of capital remunerates the latter. Hence,
at equilibrium
wt = FL(
kt−1
1 + n
, 1)
rt+1 = FK(
kt
1 + n
, 1)
1
pi(et)
(5)
given that, at every period t, aggregate capital Kt equals at equilibrium the previous
period aggregate savings in terms of capital (1+n)t−1kt−1 (for the sake of simplicity
capital is assumed to depreciate completely in one period), and aggregate labour
Lt equals (1 + n)t. Note that, according to the equations above, capital savings
are assumed to be invested into a fund that lends to firms and gets therefore the
marginal productivity of capital. Since the return to capital savings is annuitized,
it depends on the survival probability pi(et), and hence on effort et. Indeed, the
return to the aggregate savings invested in the fund is augmented by the fact that
a proportion 1−pi(et) individuals of each generation does not survive and therefore
profits are to be distributed among the proportion pi(et) of survivors only. This is
a crucial feature of our model.
3. Case in which increasing life
expectancy is costly in terms of utility
In this section, we assume that the longevity-enhancing effort has a cost in terms
of utility only, such as eating a healthy diet, not smoking, exercising, etc.
3.1 First-best steady state.
Firstly, we characterize the first-best steady state, i.e. the steady state that maxi-
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mizes the utility of the representative agent solving the problem
max
c0,c1,k,e
u(c0) + pi(e)v(c1)− γe
s.t. c0 +
pi(e)
1 + n
c1 + k = F (
k
1 + n
, 1)
(6)
where k is the steady state per capita savings in terms of capital. The constraint in
the optimization problem above is the resource constraint requiring that the output
per worker allows at any time to satisfy the consumption of the young and old agents
alive that period, the latter being only a proportion 11+n of the former (of which,
moreover, only a fraction pi(e) would have survived) because of the population
growth. The first-order conditions characterizing the solution to the problem above
are 
u′(c0)
pi(e)v′(c1)
0
pi′(e)v(c1)− γ
 = λ

1
pi(e)
1+n
1− FK( k1+n , 1) 11+n
pi′(e)
1+n c1
 (7)
for some λ 6= 0, given the monotonicity of u, along with the resource constraint in
the optimization problem above. Equivalently, the first-best steady state is a profile
c∗0, c
∗
1, e
∗, k∗ satisfying the equations:
u′(c0)
v′(c1)
= 1 + n =FK(
k
1 + n
, 1)
c0 +
pi(e)
1 + n
c1 + k =F (
k
1 + n
, 1)
pi′(e)v(c1) = γ+pi′(e)v′(c1)c1.
(8)
The first equation in the first line equates the marginal rate of substitution (actu-
ally u
′(c0)
pi(e)v′(c1)
) between first and second period consumptions to the rate at which
resources can be transferred from the first to the second period of life (namely 1+npi(e) );
it determines thus the optimal level of savings. The second equation in the first line,
on the other hand, pins down the optimal level of individual capital savings. The
second line is the feasibility constraint, while the last line determines the optimal
level of effort. This last condition is specific to the endogenous life expectancy setup
we are considering, and it states that the optimal level of effort should be such that
the marginal cost of effort (the right-hand side) should equate its marginal benefit
(the left-hand side). While the marginal benefit is simply given by the marginal
increase of the survival probability times the utility of second period consumption,
8
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the marginal cost of increasing survival consists of the sum of a direct marginal
utility cost of increasing effort (namely γ) and an indirect cost in terms of the addi-
tional pressure on resources (i.e. λpi
′(e)
1+n c1 = pi
′(e)v′(c1)c1 from the second first-order
condition in (7)). This latter effect follows from the fact that an increase in every-
one’s survival chances creates an additional demand for the existing resources. As it
will be seen in the next section, this additional cost of an increased life expectancy
is not taken into account by the individuals when choosing their effort level in a
competitive equilibrium under laissez-faire.
3.2 Laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state with money.
We turn now to characterizing the competitive equilibrium steady state allocation
under laissez-faire. The representative agent’s problem amounts (i) to choose how
much to save and how to allocate his savings between capital and money, and (ii)
to choose how much effort to make to increase the chances of surviving into the
second period, given his preferences and his budget constraints:
max
ct0,c
t
1,k
t,et,Mt
u(ct0) + pi(e
t)v(ct1)− γet
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t = wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
1
pt+1
M t.
(9)
The first-order conditions characterizing the solution to this problem are
u′(ct0)
pi(et)v′(ct1)
0
0
pi′(et)v(ct1)− γ
 = λt

1
0
1
1
0
+ µt

0
1
−rt+1
− ptpt+1
0
 (10)
for some λt and µt, along with the budget constraints of the optimization problem
above, or equivalently
u′(ct0)
v′(ct1)
= pi(et)
pt
pt+1
=pi(et)rt+1
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t =wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
1
pt+1
M t
pi′(et)v(ct1) = γ.
(11)
9
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At the competitive equilibrium, the two conditions in (5) equating at every period,
the wage rate to the marginal productivity of labor and the rental rate of capital
to its annuitized marginal productivity, must be satisfied as well. Thus at any time
t adding up the budget constraints of the young and old alive, it must hold
ct0 +
pi(et−1)
1 + n
ct−11 + k
t +
1
pt
M t
= FL(
kt−1
1 + n
, 1) + FK(
kt−1
1 + n
, 1)
kt−1
1 + n
+
pi(et−1)
pt
M t−1
1 + n
(12)
where (because of the feasibility of the allocation of resources and the constant
returns to scale of the technology) the first three terms of the left-hand side cancel
out with the first two of the right-hand side at equilibrium, so that at any t it must
hold
M t
M t+1
=
1 + n
pi(et)
. (13)
Thus, at equilibrium, the individual monetary holdings must always decrease at a
slower pace than in the standard 2-period lifetime case with certainty (where they
decrease every period by a constant factor 11+n ). This accounts for the fact that
some individuals die in the end of the first period.
At a competitive equilibrium steady state the monetary savings held by the agents
must be constant in real terms, i.e. M
t
pt =
Mt+1
pt+1 always, and therefore prices must
decrease at the same rate, so that it holds
pt
pt+1
=
1 + n
pi(e)
(14)
where e is the steady state individual level of effort. Therefore, the competitive
equilibrium steady state under laissez-faire consists of a profile c¯0, c¯1, e¯, k¯, m¯ satis-
fying
u′(c0)
v′(c1)
= 1 + n = FK(
k
1 + n
, 1)
c0 + k +m = FL(
k
1 + n
, 1)
pi(e)
1 + n
c1 = FK(
k
1 + n
, 1)
k
1 + n
+m
pi′(e)v(c1) = γ.
(15)
10
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These equations would be equivalent to those characterizing the first-best steady
state6 if it were not for the term pi′(e)v′(c1)c1 appearing in the last equation on the
first-best conditions (8), but missing in the competitive equilibrium steady state
conditions (15). As a consequence, the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady
state is not the first-best steady state, as the next proposition establishes.
Proposition 1. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy
with production and money, the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state
is inefficient when the agents can choose the disutility they are willing to incur in
order to increase their life expectancy.
Proof. Let (c∗0, c
∗
1, k
∗, e∗) be the first-best steady state solution to (8), and (c¯0, c¯1,
k¯, m¯, e¯) be the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state solution to (15).
It follows trivially from the last equation in each of the systems (8) and (15) that,
should the two steady states coincide, then since
pi′(e¯)v(c¯1) = γ = pi′(e∗)[v(c∗1)− v′(c∗1)c∗1] (16)
it would hold also
pi′(e∗)v′(c∗1)c
∗
1 = 0 (17)
which cannot hold for an interior steady state guaranteed by the good behavior at
the boundary of the representative agent’s utility. Q.E.D.
As noted above, the term pi′(e)v′(c1)c1 (which from the first-best first order condi-
tions (8) is equivalent to λpi
′(e)
1+n c1) measures the indirect cost of an increase in life
expectancy implied by the additional pressure put on resources by a bigger fraction
of survivors. This cost is not taken into account by the individuals in a competitive
equilibrium. In effect, price-taking individuals disregard the impact of their effort
—through a higher life expectancy— on the return to their own savings. More
specifically, they take as given the return to capital rt+1 while it happens to be at
equilibrium a function FK( k
t
1+n , l)/pi(e
t) of their own effort et. The same remark
holds for the return to his monetary savings which, with perfect foresight, he takes
as given to be pt/pt+1, while it turns out to depend at equilibrium on his effort,
according to (1 +n)/pi(et). As a consequence, the agents overinvest in their life ex-
pectancy with respect to the efficient level, living in expectation longer lives while
saving in terms of capital the same amount, which leads them to enjoy lower levels
of consumption in both periods, as the following proposition shows.
6To be more precise they would rather imply the first-best conditions, but under conditions guar-
anteeing the uniqueness of a first-best steady state that amounts to the same thing.
11
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Proposition 2. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations econ-
omy with production and money, if the agents can choose the disutility to incur
in order to increase their life expectancy, then at the laissez-faire competitive equi-
librium steady state profile of consumptions, savings, and life-expectancy effort
(c¯0, c¯1, k¯, m¯, e¯) satisfying (15), the agents’ first and second period consumptions are
lower and the effort devoted to increase their life expectancy e¯ bigger than at the
first-best profile (c∗0, c
∗
1, k
∗, e∗) satisfying (8), i.e.
c∗1 > c¯1
c∗0 > c¯0
k∗ = k¯
e∗ < e¯.
(18)
Proof. Firstly, k¯ = k∗ follows trivially from the equalization of the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital to the rate of growth of the population in both the laissez-faire
competitive equilibrium steady state and the first-best steady state.
As for the level of effort e, let us see first that necessarily e∗ ≤ e¯.
(1) Assume e∗ > e¯, and assume also that c∗1 ≥ c¯1. Then
pi(e∗)
1 + n
c∗1 >
pi(e¯)
1 + n
c¯1 (19)
and hence c∗0 < c¯0 from the equation
c∗0 +
pi(e∗)
1 + n
c∗1 = F (
k∗
1 + n
, 1)− k∗ = F ( k¯
1 + n
, 1)− k¯ = c¯0 + pi(e¯)1 + nc¯1 (20)
so that
u′(c∗0) > u
′(c¯0). (21)
Moreover, since c∗1 ≥ c¯1, then
1
v′(c∗1)
≥ 1
v′(c¯1)
. (22)
Therefore,
u′(c∗0)
v′(c∗1)
≥ u
′(c∗0)
v′(c¯1)
>
u′(c¯0)
v′(c¯1)
(23)
12
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which cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady state and
the first-best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are equal to
the rate of growth of the population 1 + n.
(2) Assume otherwise that e∗ > e¯ and c∗1 < c¯1. Then pi
′(e∗) < pi′(e¯) since pi is
concave, and v(c∗1) < v(c¯1), so that
pi′(e∗)v(c∗1) < pi
′(e¯)v(c¯1) (24)
but then for the last equations in conditions (8) and (15) to hold that would
require
pi′(e∗)v′(c∗1)c
∗
1 < 0 (25)
which cannot be either.
Therefore, necessarily e∗ ≤ e¯.
Let us see now that e∗ < e¯ indeed.
(1) Assume that e∗ = e¯ and that c∗1 > (<)c¯1. Then
pi(e∗)
1 + n
c∗1 > (<)
pi(e¯)
1 + n
c¯1 (26)
and hence c∗0 < (>)c¯0 by (20), from which
u′(c∗0) > (<)u
′(c¯0). (27)
Moreover, since c∗1 > (<)c¯1, then
1
v′(c∗1)
> (<)
1
v′(c¯1)
. (28)
Therefore,
u′(c∗0)
v′(c∗1)
> (<)
u′(c∗0)
v′(c¯1)
> (<)
u′(c¯0)
v′(c¯1)
(29)
which again cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady
state and the first best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are
equal to the growth factor of the population 1 + n.7
(2) Assume that e∗ = e¯ and assume moreover that c∗1 = c¯1. Then
pi(e∗)
1 + n
c∗1 =
pi(e¯)
1 + n
c¯1 (30)
and hence c∗0 = c¯0, i.e. (c
∗
0, c
∗
1, e
∗) = (c¯0, c¯1, e¯) which cannot be by Proposi-
tion 1.
7Note that although admittedly repetitive, the argument cannot be collapsed into a single step.
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Therefore, necessarily e∗ < e¯.
Finally, assume c∗1 ≤ c¯1. Then, as previously,
pi(e∗)
1 + n
c∗1 <
pi(e¯)
1 + n
c¯1 (31)
and hence c∗0 > c¯0 by (20), from which
u′(c∗0) < u
′(c¯0). (32)
Moreover, since c∗1 ≤ c¯1, then
1
v′(c∗1)
≤ 1
v′(c¯1)
. (33)
Therefore,
u′(c∗0)
v′(c∗1)
≤ u
′(c∗0)
v′(c¯1)
<
u′(c¯0)
v′(c¯1)
(34)
which cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady state and the
first best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are equal to the growth
factor of the population 1 + n.8
Therefore, necessarily c∗1 > c¯1.
As a consquence, since both at the first-best steady state and the laissez-faire com-
petitive steady state, it holds
u′(c∗0)
v′(c∗1)
= 1 + n =
u′(c¯0)
v′(c¯1)
(35)
c∗1 > c¯1 implies c
∗
0 > c¯0 as well.
Q.E.D.
In the following section, we show how to decentralize the first-best steady state as
a competitive equilibrium.
8The same remark as in footnote 6 applies here.
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3.3 Implementation of the First-Best Steady State as a competitive equi-
librium steady state.
Note that many instances of unhealthy behaviors with a direct link with life ex-
pectancy that do not have an impact on the agent’s budget constraints (like not
exercising or taking prolonged sunbaths) go, for that same reason, untaxed.9 More-
over, in many cases, it is not possible to tax them indirectly either, by taxing, for
example, saving returns (held in terms of either capital or money). In effect, on the
one hand, taxing savings may disincentive the prospect of a high life expectancy
and, thus, it could discourage a healthy behavior. But, on the other hand, taxing
savings distorts the consumption-saving decision, modifying the condition equating
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption to the return to sav-
ings in (15), which would make it impossible to coincide with the first-best steady
state.10
Therefore, consider instead the following policy. Announce at each period t to
the newborn generation that in the second period a lump-sum tax/subsidy of an
amount ct−11 ln
pi(et)
pi(et−1) will be raised/transferred. Note that although pi(e
t), the
survival rate of generation t, is not known at the time t of the announcement
(everything else is), it will crucially be nonetheless known at the time the policy
will have to be implemented in t+ 1. As a matter of fact, the individuals are given
the opportunity —by their knowledge of the exact form the lump-sum tax/subsidy
will take— to manipulate the tax or subsidy. As a consequence, they will change
their behavior. Interestingly enough, it turns out that, since they modified their
behavior, it is actually them who are being manipulated by the policy maker in
order to implement the first-best steady state.
In effect, the representative agent’s problem becomes now (with the second period
9Others (like smoking and drinking alcohol) do. And others still that could be taxed (like eating
junk food) are not, yet. Nevertheless, harmful behaviors, to one-self or to others, are taxed indeed,
through fines (e.g. for speeding and other instances of dangerous driving).
10For instance, in Leroux (2008), it is shown that, in a static partial equilibrium framework, the
first-best allocation can be restored through a tax on savings or, equivalently, on second period
consumption. In this case, the individual has less incentives to invest in a higher life expectancy
as his second period consumption is distorted downward.
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lump-sum tax/subsidy)
max
ct0,c
t
1,k
t,et,Mt
u(ct0) + pi(e
t)v(ct1)− γet
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t = wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
1
pt+1
M t − ct−11 ln
pi(et)
pi(et−1)
(36)
the solution of which is characterized by the first-order conditions

u′(ct0)
pi(et)v′(ct1)
0
0
pi′(et)v(ct1)− γ
 = λt

1
0
1
1
0
+ µt

0
1
−rt+1
− ptpt+1
ct−11
pi′(et)
pi(et)
 (37)
along with the budget constraints of the optimization problem above or, equiva-
lently, by the system of equations
u′(ct0)
v′(ct1)
= pi(et)
pt
pt+1
= pi(et)rt+1
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t = wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
1
pt+1
M t−ct−11 ln
pi(et)
pi(et−1)
pi′(et)v(ct1) = γ + pi
′(et)v′(ct1)c
t−1
1 .
(38)
As before, at equilibrium the two conditions (5) determining the wage and rental
rates are still satisfied. As for the feasibility condition, adding up the budget con-
straints of the agents living at any given period t one gets
ct0 +
pi(et−1)
1 + n
ct−11 + k
t +
1
pt
M t =
FL(
kt−1
1 + n
, 1) + FK(
kt−1
1 + n
, 1)
kt−1
1 + n
+
pi(et−1)
1 + n
1
pt
M t−1
− pi(e
t−1)
1 + n
ct−21 ln
pi(et−1)
pi(et−2)
.
(39)
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Note again that (because of the feasibility and constant returns to scale) the first
three terms of the left-hand side cancel out with the first two of the right-handside,
so that (39) it is equivalent to
1
pt
M t =
pi(et−1)
1 + n
1
pt
M t−1 − pi(e
t−1)
1 + n
ct−21 ln
pi(et−1)
pi(et−2)
(40)
which, at the steady state, implies again
pt
pt+1
=
1 + n
pi(e)
(41)
as the last term in (40) vanishes. Therefore, the competitive equilibrium steady
state is now a profile c¯0, c¯1, e¯, k¯, m¯ satisfying
u′(c0)
v′(c1)
= 1 + n = FK(
k
1 + n
, 1)
c0 + k +m = FL(
k
1 + n
, 1)
c1 = FK(
k
1 + n
,1)
1
pi(e)
k +
1 + n
pi(e)
m
pi′(e)v(c1) = γ + pi′(e)v′(c1)c1.
(42)
The solution to this system coincides with the solution to equations (8) above.11
Note that the tax/susbidy ct−11 ln
pi(et)
pi(et−1) is zero at the steady state, so that no tax
or subsidy is actually raised or handed out in that case, keeping the government
budget trivially balanced. As a matter of fact, the mere announcement of the policy
makes the agents modify their choices in such a way that the first-best steady state
is attained in a decentralized way when this was not possible under laissez-faire.
This result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy
with production and money, if the agents can choose the disutility to incur in order
to increase their life expectancy, the first-best profile (c∗0, c
∗
1, k
∗, e∗) satisfying (8) is
11To be precise, every solution to this system is also a solution to equations (8). Therefore, under
conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the first-best steady state, the two systems of equations
are equivalent.
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a competitive equilibrium outcome if a second period a lump-sum tax (subsidy) of
an amount ct−11 ln
pi(et)
pi(et−1) is raised (transferred) from (to) each generation t.
This policy restores the first-best steady state for two reasons. First, adjusting their
effort, the individuals directly reduce the tax they face (or increase the subsidy they
receive) when old and, second, they adjust their probability of survival according
to the prospect of facing a tax which reduces their future consumption or a subsidy
that increases it. By imposing a lump-sum subsidy or tax on consumption when
old, the planner makes more or less attractive the prospect of survival and thus
provides incentives to the individual to choose the right level of effort.
4. Case in which increasing life
expectancy is costly in terms of resources
Assume now that the individual can increase his life expectancy at some cost in
terms of resources, so that the individual can divert part of his first period income
away from consumption and saving, in order to increase his chances of survival.
Thus, this effort appears directly in the individual’s first period budget constraint
instead of directly in the individual’s utility. As in the previous case, we will charac-
terize first the first-best steady state, then the competitive equilibrium steady state
under laissez-faire, and finally the policy that implements the first-best steady state
as a competitive equilibrium outcome.
4.1 First-best steady state.
The first-best steady state results in this case from solving the problem
max
c0,c1,k,e
u(c0) + pi(e)v(c1)
c0 +
pi(e)
1 + n
c1 + k + e = F (
k
1 + n
, 1)
(43)
where e denotes the resources devoted to increase the individuals’ life expectancy
(through their probability of survival) as, say, health expenditures, and that enters
directly the feasibility constraint. The solution to the optimization problem above
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is characterized by the first-order conditions

u′(c0)
pi(e)v′(c1)
0
pi′(e)v(c1)
 = λ

1
pi(e)
1+n
1− FK( k1+n , 1) 11+n
1 + pi
′(e)
1+n c1
 (44)
along with the constraint of the problem above. Equivalently, a first-best steady
state consists of a profile c∗0, c
∗
1, e
∗, k∗ satisfying
u′(c0)
v′(c1)
= 1 + n = FK(
k
1 + n
, 1)
c0 +
pi(e)
1 + n
c1 + k + e =F (
k
1 + n
, 1)
pi′(e)v(c1) = (1 + n)v′(c1) + pi′(e)v′(c1)c1.
(45)
Note that the first line is the same condition as the one obtained in the case where in-
creasing life expectancy is costly in terms of utility in (8): first, the equality between
the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution and the rate at which consumption
can be transferred between the two periods, and second, the maximization of out-
put net of capital replacement. The feasibility condition in the second line includes
now as an expenditure the resources e devoted to pin down the life expectancy of
the individual, i.e. health expenditures. Thus output net of replacement of used
up capital must be at any period equal to the consumption of young individuals,
plus the consumption of the survivors of the preceding generation, and the health
expenditures.
Finally, the last condition differs from the one obtained in the utility-effort case in
(8). Indeed, the term (1+n)v′(c1) is now substituted to the term γ in the right-hand
side. As before, this condition still requires that, at the first-best steady state, the
marginal benefit of increasing the life expectancy, pi′(e)v(c1), exactly matches its
marginal cost which, in this case, consists of (i) the direct impact that an increase
in health expenditures has on second period consumption —reducing it at a rate
1+n
pi(e) and hence reducing second period utility at a rate (1 + n)v
′(c1) (first term
on the right-hand side)— and of (ii) the indirect cost (common to both the utility-
effort and the resources-effort cases) in terms of the additional pressure on resources
following from bigger cohorts of survivors (the second term λpi
′(e)
1+n c1 = pi
′(e)v′(c1)c1
in the right-hand side).
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4.2 Competitive equilibrium steady state under laissez-faire.
The representative agent’s problem under perfect competition is in this case
max
ct0,c
t
1,k
t,et,Mt
u(ct0) + pi(e
t)v(ct1)
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t + et = wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
1
pt+1
M t.
(46)
As in the utility-effort case, the individual has to decide how much to save as well
as the composition of his savings portfolio in terms of capital and money. The
difference now comes from the fact that, he must decide as well how much of his
income to devote to health expenditures et in order to pin down the optimal (from
his viewpoint) life expectancy. The solution to the agent’s problem is characterized
by the first-order conditions
u′(ct0)
pi(et)v′(ct1)
0
0
pi′(et)v(ct1)
 = λt

1
0
1
1
1
+ µt

0
1
−rt+1
− ptpt+1
0
 (47)
along with the budget constraints in the problem above. Equivalently, agent t’s
choice is the solution to
u′(ct0)
v′(ct1)
= pi(et)
pt
pt+1
= pi(et)rt+1
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t + et = wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t+
1
pt+1
M t
pi′(et)v(ct1) =pi(e
t)v′(ct1)rt+1.
(48)
At the competitive equilibrium, the wage and rental rate are still determined by the
conditions (5) determining the wage and rental rate of capital, so that the return
to savings invested in capital by a generation depends on the survival rate of that
same generation. Under competitive conditions, the individuals take these variables
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as given. Again, from the addition of the budget constraints of the agents alive at
any given period t
ct0 +
pi(et−1)
1 + n
ct−11 + k
t +
1
pt
M t + et =
FL(
kt−1
1 + n
, 1) + FK(
kt−1
1 + n
, 1)
kt−1
1 + n
+
pi(et−1)
pt
M t−1
1 + n
(49)
it follows that the feasibility of the allocation is equivalent to
Mt
Mt+1
=
1 + n
pi(et)
(50)
which at a steady state implies also
pt
pt+1
=
1 + n
pi(e)
. (51)
Therefore, a competitive equilibrium steady state under laissez-faire consists of a
profile c¯0, c¯1, e¯, k¯, m¯ such that
u′(c0)
v′(c1)
= 1 + n = FK(
k
1 + n
, 1)
c0 + k +m+ e = FL(
k
1 + n
, 1)
c1 =
1
pi(e)
FK(
k
1 + n
, 1)k +
1 + n
pi(e)
m
pi′(e)v(c1) = (1 + n)v′(c1).
(52)
Only the last equation in the system above differs from the one in the first-best
system of equations in (45). Indeed, compared to the first-best system (45), the
term pi′(e)v′(c1)c1 is missing in (52), which is simply due to the fact that the return
to savings invested in capital, rt+1 = 1pi(et)FK(
kt
1+n , l) and in money, pt/pt+1 =
(1 + n)/pi(et), are taken as given by the individual under perfect competition. He
does not take into account that, by investing in his longevity, he is also going to
modify the overall return of his savings and thus, his consumption possibilities when
old. As a consequence, the suboptimality of the competitive equilibrium steady state
follows, as the following proposition establishes.
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Proposition 4. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy
with production and money, the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state
is inefficient when the agents can choose the resources to invest into increasing their
life expectancy.
Proof. Letting (c∗0, c
∗
1, k
∗, e∗) be the first-best steady state solution to (45), and
(c¯0, c¯1, k¯, m¯, e¯) be the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state solution to
(52), it follows trivially from the last equation in each of the systems (45) and (52)
that should the two coincide, then since
pi′(e¯)v(c¯1) = (1 + n)v′(c¯1) = (1 + n)v′(c∗1) = pi
′(e∗)[v(c∗1)− v′(c∗1)c∗1] (53)
it would hold also
pi′(e∗)v′(c∗1)c
∗
1 = 0 (54)
which cannot hold for an interior steady state guaranteed by the good behavior at
the boundary of the agent’s utility. Q.E.D.
As in the previous utility-effort case, the fact that the individuals do not take into
account the stress that a higher life expectancy puts on the available resources leads
them to invest too much resources into it compared to what would be the optimal
amount, i.e. e¯ > e∗. The next proposition establishes this.
Proposition 5. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations econ-
omy with production and money, if the agents can choose the resources to in-
vest into increasing their life expectancy, then at the laissez-faire competitive equi-
librium steady state profile of consumptions, savings, and life-expectancy effort
(c¯0, c¯1, k¯, m¯, e¯) satisfying (52), the agent’s second-period consumption is not bigger
and the resources invested into increasing his life expectancy e¯ are not smaller than
at the first-best profile (c∗0, c
∗
1, k
∗, e∗) satisfying (45), while his capital savings are
the same, i.e.
c∗1 ≥ c¯1
k∗ = k¯
e∗ ≤ e¯
(55)
Proof. 12 Firstly, k¯ = k∗ follows trivially from the equalization of the marginal
productivity of capital to the rate of growth of the population in both the laissez-
faire competitive equilibrium steady state and the first-best steady state.
12The proof parallels that of the utility-effort case, but maybe surprisingly has a few twists that
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As for the level of effort e and the second -period consumption c1, let us see first
that necessarily e∗ ≤ e¯ and c∗1 ≥ c¯1.
(1) Assume e∗ > e¯ and c∗1 ≥ c¯1. Then
pi(e∗)
1 + n
c∗1 + e
∗ >
pi(e¯)
1 + n
c¯1 + e¯ (56)
and hence c∗0 < c¯0 from the equation
c∗0 +
pi(e)
1 + n
c∗1 + e
∗ = F (
k∗
1 + n
, 1)− k∗ = F ( k¯
1 + n
, 1)− k¯ = c¯0 + pi(e¯)1 + nc¯1 + e¯ (57)
so that
u′(c∗0) > u
′(c¯0). (58)
Moreover, since c∗1 ≥ c¯1, then
1
v′(c∗1)
≥ 1
v′(c¯1)
. (59)
Therefore,
u′(c∗0)
v′(c∗1)
≥ u
′(c∗0)
v′(c¯1)
>
u′(c¯0)
v′(c¯1)
(60)
which cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady state and
the first best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are equal to
the growth factor of the population 1 + n.
As a consequence, either e∗ ≤ e¯, or c∗1 < c¯1, or both hold.
(2) Assume that both e∗ ≤ e¯ and c∗1 < c¯1 hold. Then, as previously,
pi(e∗)
1 + n
c∗1 + e
∗ <
pi(e¯)
1 + n
c¯1 + e¯ (61)
and hence c∗0 > c¯0 by (57), from which
u′(c∗0) < u
′(c¯0). (62)
make it significantly different. Notably, a consequence of them is that no relation can be established
between the first period consumptions c¯0 and c∗0, as well as that neither c
∗
1 > c¯1 nor e
∗ < e¯ are
guaranteed anymore.
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Moreover, since c∗1 ≤ c¯1, then
1
v′(c∗1)
≤ 1
v′(c¯1)
. (63)
Therefore,
u′(c∗0)
v′(c∗1)
≤ u
′(c∗0)
v′(c¯1)
<
u′(c¯0)
v′(c¯1)
(64)
which cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady state and
the first best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are equal to
the growth factor of the population 1 + n.
Therefore, either e∗ ≤ e¯ and c∗1 ≥ c¯1, or e∗ > e¯ and c∗1 < c¯1.
(3) Assume e∗ > e¯ and c∗1 < c¯1. Then v
′(c∗1) > v
′(c¯1) holds, as well as pi′(e∗) <
pi′(e¯) and v(c∗1) < v(c¯1), and hence
pi′(e∗)v(c∗1) < pi
′(e¯)v(c¯1) (65)
But since,
pi′(e∗)v(c∗1) = (1 + n)v
′(c∗1) + pi(e
∗)v′(c∗1)c
∗
1
pi′(e¯)v(c¯1) = (1 + n)v′(c¯1)
(66)
then necesarily pi(e∗)v′(c∗1)c
∗
1 < 0, which cannot be.
Therefore e∗ ≤ e¯ and c∗1 ≥ c¯1.
Q.E.D.
It is worth noting that, as opposed to what happened in the disutility-effort case,
nothing can be said now about how do the first-period consumptions c∗0 and c¯0
compare. This is simply due to the fact that when e enters the budget constraint, it
gives one additional degree of freedom to the problem, which leaves undetermined
how c∗0 and c¯0 compare.
4.3 FBSS implementation as a competitive equilibrium steady state with
money and taxes.
Contrarily to what happened in the utility-effort case, health expenditures can be
taxed or subsidized directly. This simplifies considerably the implementation of
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the first-best steady state. For instance, assume that the government taxes health
expenditures at a rate σt and hands at t+ 1 a lump-sum transfer T t to agents born
at time t. In this case, the representative agent’s problem becomes
max
ct0,c
t
1,k
t,et,Mt
u(ct0) + pi(e
t)v(ct1)
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t + (1 + σt)et = wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
1
pt+1
M t + T t
(67)
The solution to this problem is characterized by the first-order conditions
u′(ct0)
pi(et)v′(ct1)
0
0
pi′(et)v(ct1)
 = λt

1
0
1
1
1 + σt
+ µt

0
1
−rt+1
− ptpt+1
0
 (68)
and the budget constraints in the problem above, or, equivalently, by
u′(ct0)
v′(ct1)
= pi(et)
pt
pt+1
=pi(et)rt+1
ct0 + k
t +
1
pt
M t + (1+σt)et = wt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
1
pt+1
M t + T t
pi′(et)v(ct1) = pi(e
t)v′(ct1)rt+1(1 + σ
t).
(69)
At a competitive equilibrium, the conditions (5) determining the wage and rental
rate of capital still hold. We require also that the government runs a balanced
budget at every period, so that in every period t it must hold
etσt = T t−1
pi(et−1)
(1 + n)
(70)
where the amount raised by taxes on health expenditures on the left-hand side
matches at every period the amount handed out to the survivors of the previous
generation, on the right-hand side. Finally, adding up the budget constraints of the
agents alive at any given period
ct0+
pi(et−1)
1 + n
ct−11 + k
t +
1
pt
M t + (1 + σt)et =
FL(
kt−1
1 + n
, 1) + FK(
kt−1
1 + n
, 1)
kt−1
1 + n
+
pi(et−1)
pt
M t−1
1 + n
+ T t−1
pi(et−1)
(1 + n)
(71)
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it follows that the feasibility condition is again equivalent to
Mt
Mt+1
=
1 + n
pi(et)
(72)
which at the steady state requires
pt
pt+1
=
1 + n
pi(e)
. (73)
Therefore, the competitive equilibrium steady state is characterized now by a profile
c¯0, c¯1, e¯, k¯, m¯ satisfying
u′(c0)
v′(c1)
= 1 + n =FK(
k
1 + n
, 1)
c0 + k +m+ (1 + σ)e = FL(
k
1 + n
, 1)
c1 =
1
pi(e)
FK(
k
1 + n
, 1)k +
1 + n
pi(e)
m+ T
pi′(e)v(c1) = v′(c1)(1 + n)(1 + σ)
eσ = T
pi(e)
1 + n
.
(74)
Comparing conditions (74) with those characterizing the first-best steady state in
(45), it is straightforward to check that they share the same solution if the tax rate
is13
σ =
pi′(e)
1 + n
c1 (75)
Therefore, in order to implement the first-best steady state, the government just
needs to announce at the beginning of each period t that (i) health expenditures
are going to be taxed then at a rate
σt =
pi′(et−1)
1 + n
ct−11 (76)
13It can be easily verified that an equivalent expression for the optimal tax rate at the first-best
steady state is
σ =
v′(c1)c1
v(c1)− v′(c1)c1
Note, that if v(.) has constant elasticity of substitution, v(x) = x, this tax takes the form ε/(1−ε)
and depends thus only on the parameter  and not on the particular value of the steady state second
period consumption c1.
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(which depends only on known variables and cannot be manipulated by individuals
born in period t) and (ii) a lump-sum transfer will be made to period-t agents at
t+ 1 of an amount equal to14
T t = et−1σt
1 + n
pi(et−1)
=
pi′(et−1)et−1
pi(et−1)
ct−11 (77)
The lump-sum transfer depends thus on the elasticity of the survival probabil-
ity with respect to health expenditures and on the consumption when old of the
previous generation. Replacing these two expressions into conditions in (74) char-
acterizing the competitive equilibrium steady state with taxes, it is straightforward
to check that at the steady state the conditions coincide with those of the first-
best steady state in (45),15 so that such tax-and-transfers scheme implements the
first-best steady state. This result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy
with production and money, if the agents can choose the resources to invest into
increasing their life expectancy, the first-best profile (c∗0, c
∗
1, k
∗, e∗) satisfying (45) is
a competitive equilibrium outcome if such expenditure is taxed at a rate
σt =
pi′(et−1)
1 + n
ct−11 (78)
for each generation t, and a second period lump-sum transfer is made to each
generation t of an amount
T t =
pi′(et−1)et−1
pi(et−1)
ct−11 . (79)
Finally, consider the expected per capita net taxes paid by any given generation t,
i.e. τ t = σtet− pi(et)T t (note that the transfer T t is conditional on the individual’s
survival, while the contribution is paid in first period, with certainty). Replacing
for the expressions of σt and T t, it amounts to
τ t = pi′(et−1)ct−11 [
et
1 + n
− pi(e
t)et−1
pi(et−1)
] (80)
14Note that the formulation of the transfer T t is defined such that it depends only on variables
which cannot be manipulated by the individuals born in period t. The consequence of such an
assumption is that the budget balance condition, although satisfied at the steady state, will not
be satisfied ex post, outside the steady state.
15Under assumtions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the latter.
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which, at the steady state, becomes
τ = pi′(e)c1e[
1
1 + n
− 1] < 0. (81)
These expected net taxes are negative simply because of our assumption of pos-
itive demographic growth as (if n = 0, we would also have τ = 0). This is not
incompatible with budget balance at each period, which is guaranteed by (70).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we address in a dynamic setup the externality created by expenses or
individual behaviors that have an impact on the individual’s life expectancy. Becker
and Philipson (1998) first showed in a static setup how the individuals’ attempts to
increase the ”quantity” of their life also affect the ”quality” of it in a way that they
do not perfectly anticipate, which typically leads to an inefficient outcome. More
specifically, we show, in this paper, that in an overlapping generations economy
with production a` la Diamond (1965) the competitive equilibrium steady state still
differs from the first-best steady state because of this external effect of longevity
on the return to savings, both when individuals can affect their life expectancy
by means of health expenditures, or when they can do it by just improving their
habits in a way that is costly for them in terms of utility (but at no cost in terms
of resources). The externality is created by the fact that individuals do not take
into account that their life expectancy affects the return to their annuitized savings
(held either in money or in capital) and, hence, their consumption possibilities
when old. In this case, they are likely to invest too much in their longevity in
comparison to what would be optimal. We show nonetheless that the first-best
steady state can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium in both cases if the
government announces and implements the adequate policy of taxes and transfers,
and we identify this policies.
Still our paper could be extended in several ways. First, we consider a type of effort
which is costly in terms of utility and in terms of resources but we excluded the case
where the effort requires time investment. This would certainly have implications
on the labour supply. Moreover, we assume a perfect annuity market, which may
be far from what is observed in reality; in a extension of this paper, we should relax
this assumption. This is on our research agenda.
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